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In this paper I study a new business cycle fact recently documented by Bachmann and 
Bayer (2011): the dispersion of the distribution of investment rates across firms is 
procyclical. Using data from German firm, the authors find a correlation coefficient 
between the standard deviation of investment distribution and the cyclical component of 
output of 0.45. They also report a correlation coefficient for US economy of 0.33. Using a 
model similar to Khan and Thomas's (2003), that is standard to heterogeneous firms 
literature, I obtain a correlation coefficient of 0.57. In the model I also consider a 
government sector that collects taxes on corporate profits. In such model, with a corporate 
tax of 23.5%, which corresponds to German economy, I obtain a correlation coefficient of 
0.46 and when I consider a corporate tax rate of 18.79% that corresponds to US economy I 




En este trabajo estudio un nuevo hecho del ciclo económico recientemente documentado 
por Bachmann y Bayer (2011): la dispersión de la distribución de las tasas de inversión a 
través de las firmas es procíclica. Usando datos de firmas alemanas, los autores encuentran 
un coeficiente de correlación entre la desviación estándar de la distribución de inversión y 
el componente cíclico del producto de 0.45. Para los Estados Unidos, los autores reportan 
un coeficiente de correlación de 0.33. Usando un modelo similar al de Khan y Thomas 
(2003), que es estándar en la literatura de firmas heterogéneas, obtengo un coeficiente de 
correlación de 0.57. En el modelo también considero un gobierno que recauda impuestos 
sobre las ganancias corporativas. En tal modelo, con un impuesto corporativo de 23.5%, el 
cual corresponde a la economía alemana, obtengo un coeficiente de correlación de 0.46 y 
cuando considero un impuesto corporativo de 18.79% que corresponde a la economía de 
Estados Unidos, encuentro un coeficiente igual a 0.51. 
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At ﬁrm level, investment is lumpy and infrequent. This has eﬀects not only in the
aggregate investment behavior (Bachmann, Caballero and Engel, 2010) but also on
the distribution of investment across ﬁrms. In this paper I analyze the positive
correlation between the dispersion of investment rates across ﬁrms and the business
cycle recently documented by Bachmann and Bayer (2011) in a model where ﬁrms
face ﬁxed costs to capital adjustment and have to pay corporate taxes. Using a
wide sample of German ﬁrms, Bachmann and Bayer found that the dispersion of the
distribution of the investment rates across ﬁrms is procyclical. In other words, when
the business cycle goes up, the dispersion of investment rates across ﬁrms, measured
by its standard deviation, increases, and the opposite happens when the business
cycle goes down. In particular, they documented that the correlation coeﬃcient
between the cross-sectional standard deviation of ﬁrms’ investment rates and the
cyclical component of aggregate output is 0.45. They also reported a correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.33 using a sample of United States’ ﬁrms. Then, the authors analyzed
whether a heterogeneous ﬁrms model can account for the empirical evidence. They
found that their model economy implies a correlation of 0.58.
In this paper I discuss Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011) results in the context of the
model of Khan and Thomas (2003), which is standard to the literature of hetero-
geneous ﬁrms that face ﬁxed adjustment costs. In this model, ﬁrms have to incur
in idiosyncratic ﬁxed costs to undertake capital investment. Because of these costs,
in each period only a proportion of total ﬁrms will adjust their capital stock while
others will let their capital depreciate. In this environment, heterogeneity arises en-
dogenously and distributions of ﬁrms over capital and investment rates characterize
the economy. Additionally, in this model there is a government sector that collects
taxes over ﬁrms’ corporate proﬁts.
In this simple framework, procyclicality of investment rate dispersion emerges
naturally. In order to gain some intuition, take the following example. Consider
an economy that begins in a steady state where all ﬁrms are concentrated in the
same level of capital (all the ﬁrms are identical). In this example (as in the model)
capital is deﬁned as the amount of services that the stock of capital provides. To
make it simpler, assume that there is no depreciation of capital. In this stylized
economy a positive productivity shock will induce ﬁrms to adjust their capital stock
but, due to the adjustment costs, only those ﬁrms that observe that it is proﬁtable
1to change their capital will do that. As a consequence, the dispersion of ﬁrms over
capital will increase and the same will happen with the distribution of ﬁrms over
investment rates. Prior to the shock, ﬁrms’ investment rate was equal to zero, but
after that, some ﬁrms incur in positive investment while other do not. Therefore,
the dispersion of investment rates across ﬁrms increases.
This intuition applies to both models, the one developed in Bachmann and
Bayer’s (2011) work and the model that I present in this paper. In order to make
my results quantitatively comparable with Bachmann and Bayer’s, I simulate my
economy ﬁrst considering a corporate tax rate equal to zero. I ﬁnd a correlation
coeﬃcient between investment rate dispersion across ﬁrms and the cyclical compo-
nent of output of 0.57. As it will become more clear in the following sections, I have
obtained the same correlation found by Bachmann and Bayer (2011) in a simpler
model.
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that the presence of a positive corporate tax
rate dampens the correlation between the dispersion of investment rates distribution
and the business cycle and helps to reduce the gap between empirical evidence and
model results. A positive corporate tax rate reduces the procyclicality of investment
rates dispersion across ﬁrms because it reduces the value of the ﬁrms compared with
the adjustment cost, making them less willing to adjust, and also because it reduces
the optimal capital to which ﬁrms adjust when they decide to do so. Consequently,
when a productivity shock hits the economy, ﬁrms are less responsive than under
a corporate tax rate equal to 0. In particular, I ﬁnd that a model that considers a
corporate tax rate of 18.79%, which is the actual corporate tax rate for the United
States calculated by Djankov et al. (2008), implies a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.51,
and, if one considers a corporate tax rate of 23.5%, which corresponds to the economy
of Germany, one obtains a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.46 which is almost equal to
data evidence found by Bachmann and Bayer (2011) for German ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section review the
literature related with the topic of this paper. The next four sections present the
model, its solution and the numerical method used to simulate the model’s dynamics.
Section 7 shows the results and some of its implications. Section 8 concludes.
22 Literature Review
My work relates with existing literature in several ways. The eﬀects of corporate tax
rates on investment decisions have been thought coming via the user cost of capital
and the price sensitivity of investment, which combines the impacts of interest rates,
the tax burden, the depreciation rate and adjustment costs on capital accumulation.
Chirinko et al. (1999) ﬁnd a negative correlation between the user cost of capital
and investment in a wide microeconomic sample.1
Economists have debated these issues at length motivated by the idea that sim-
ple fully ﬂexible models cannot account for investment ﬂuctuations because they are
too stylized. The ﬁrst attempts to bridge that gap, and give more realistic assump-
tions to economic models, was the incorporation of a cost for adjusting the capital
stock. According to these models, investment decisions are based on forward-looking
considerations and rational expectations of future variables. Because investment im-
plies a trade-oﬀ between current costs and future earnings, it seems clear that only
those ﬁrms that anticipate good future economic conditions for their products will
accumulate capital, while others will wait and let their capital depreciate, or may
actively reduce their capital stock.2 The literature on adjustment costs has focused
mainly on convex adjustment costs in general and quadratic costs in particular.
In these kinds of models, large increments in the capital stock generate bigger ad-
justment costs. Therefore, ﬁrms try to adjust their capital level to the optimum
slowly. However, quadratic adjustment cost models were diﬃcult to reconcile with
microeconomic evidence, especially when economists did realize that most of the
investment takes place in a single episode with long periods of inaction. Indeed,
plant investment looked more lumpy, in the sense that it was accumulated in short
bursts, than the investment patterns implied by quadratic-costs models. The em-
pirical evidence on the lumpy behavior of investment comes mainly from Doms and
Dunne (1998). Their work, based on a wide sample of American manufacturing
plants, revealed that a big part of the investment that ﬁrms undertake in one year
is made in a single event. However, these spikes of investment are diﬃcult to rec-
oncile with models where ﬁrms’ investment patterns are smooth. Caballero at al.
(1995) ﬁnd that the lumpy behavior is better explained by a Ss-type model where
investment is undertaken on noncontinuous patterns with large periods of inaction.
However, the relevance of lumpy investment for DSGE models is still under debate.
1See Hassett and Hubbard (1998) for an extensive literature review of these issues.
2Caballero (1999) reviews part of the discussion on this matter.
3Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) ﬁnd that adding ﬁxed, non-
convex, adjustment costs to an otherwise standard DSGE model does not improve
its ability to replicate the main business cycle features of the data. Indeed, non-
linearities and lumpy investment disappear when ﬁrms are aggregated in a general
equilibrium. The authors conclude that ﬁxed adjustment costs are not relevant and
quadratic-adjustment-costs models are able to replicate the main features of ag-
gregate investment. Veracierto (2002), examining investment irreversibilities, ﬁnds
similar results to Thomas’s (2002). Nonetheless, Bachmann et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
the results of Khan and Thomas (2008) are not robust to changes of calibration.
In a richer model, they ﬁnd that lumpy investment does not disappear in general
equilibrium and ﬁxed adjustment costs are relevant to explain aggregate investment
ﬂuctuations. Other studies have documented the relevance of adjustment costs in
related issues. For example, the work of Bachmann and Bayer (2011), that will
be discussed in depth below in this section, argue that some empirical facts of in-
vestment distribution across ﬁrms can only be accounted for a model with ﬁxed
adjustment costs. The works of Bloom, Bond and Vaan Reenen (2007) and Bloom,
Floetotto and Jaimovish (2010) discuss the role of uncertainty shocks and their ef-
fects of ﬁrms’ investment behavior. In these models, ﬁrms face ﬁxed adjustment
costs that make them unwilling to invest when future conditions become uncertain.
I focus on the dynamic eﬀects of corporate taxation on aggregate macroeconomics
variables in a general equilibrium framework. A big part of the research in the ﬁeld
has focused on the impact of distortionary taxation in a single ﬁrm’s decision prob-
lem in partial equilibrium. These models ignore ﬁrms’ heterogeneity, which may be
important for understanding the impact of diﬀerent tax rates. However, besides this
paper, other important advances have been made for studying these issues in general
equilibrium. For instance, Gourio and Miao (2010a, 2010b) study the eﬀects of cap-
ital and dividend taxation on investment and ﬁnd that changes taxation could have
had a negative eﬀect on investment in the United States. They estimate that an
unexpected and temporary reduction of the capital tax rate reduces the investment
level by 11% in the short run while the steady-state level of macroeconomic aggre-
gates is unchanged. The main diﬀerences of my paper with their study are that the
heterogeneity in their model comes from diﬀerent histories of idiosyncratic shocks
that ﬁrms face and that they are not considering aggregate uncertainty. That sim-
pliﬁes a lot the computation of the model because the distribution of ﬁrms over state
variables does not enter in the ﬁrm’s maximization problem. In the model that I
4present here, heterogeneity comes from diﬀerences in the adjustment costs that ﬁrms
face to undertake capital changes. Since in each period only those ﬁrms that expect
that adjusting to the optimal capital level will be proﬁtable will do so, while others
will let their capital depreciate. For this reason, the economy is characterized by
a distribution of ﬁrms over capital and because aggregate capital and price level
depend of this distribution, it has to be considered in the ﬁrms’ decision problem.
In another paper, Miao and Wang (2009) study the eﬀects of corporate taxation
on investment distribution across ﬁrms in a model where ﬁrms face convex and
non-convex adjustment costs. They show that an anticipated decrease in the future
corporate income tax rate raises investment and the adjustment rate immediately,
while an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment
and the adjustment rate initially. The main diﬀerence between their research and
mine is that they analyze the eﬀects of permanent and transitory changes on cor-
porate taxation only in the long run steady-state of the economy, while I analyze
both, the steady state eﬀects of corporate tax changes and the impact of corporate
taxation on aggregate investment dynamic over the business cycle.
To end this section I will explain the main ﬁndings of Bachmann and Bayer’s
(2011). These authors document a novel business cycle fact: the dispersion of the
investment rate across ﬁrms is procyclical. Using a panel data set of 30,000 German
ﬁrms, they study the business cycle proprieties of the cross-section distribution of
ﬁrms over investment rates. Their main empirical results are the following. First,
across 2-digit industries, there is a positive association between the cyclical com-
ponent of the extensive margin of investment (the proportion of ﬁrms incurring in
investment activities each period) and the cyclicality of the investment rate disper-
sion. This means that, when the economic cycle goes up, the number of ﬁrms that
increase their capital stock moves in the same direction and, at the same time, the
distribution of ﬁrms over investment becomes more disperse. Second, in the goods-
producing sectors, where one could expect adjustment costs to be more important,
the dispersion of the investment rate across ﬁrms is procyclical. Again this means
that, when a shock hits the economy, some ﬁrms adjust their capital while others do
not, and this eﬀect makes the dispersion of the investment rates across ﬁrms higher.
Third, the procyclicality of the dispersion of the investment rate declines with the
size of the ﬁrms. Their most important result is the relation between the dispersion
of the distribution of investment rates across ﬁrms and the business cycle. They
ﬁnd a correlation coeﬃcient between the standard deviation of the investment rate
5across ﬁrms and the cyclical component of aggregate output of 0.45.
Bachmann and Bayer also report this correlation for the US economy. Using
a data set of American ﬁrms from Compustat, they ﬁnd a correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.33. This is lower than the correlation found in the sample of German ﬁrms,
however, it should be considered as a lower bound. Compustat covers only publicly
traded and mostly large ﬁrms.3 Since large ﬁrms are less responsive to changes
in economic environment, the correlation coeﬃcient between the dispersion of the
distribution of investment rates across ﬁrms and the cyclical component of output
should be lower in this group of ﬁrms compared with a larger sample that considers
smaller ﬁrms.
It is possible that the results observed by Bachmann and Bayer (2011) are guided
by a selection bias. The sample that they use to obtain their main statistics con-
siders entry and exit of ﬁrms and, therefore, the procyclicality of the dispersion of
investment rates may be explained by the fact that, during a boom more ﬁrms of
diﬀerent size enter the productive sector, incurring in positive investment, and dur-
ing a bust, less proﬁtable ﬁrms disappear and the continuing ﬁrms do not invest.
However, as Clementi and Palazzo (2010) have shown in a model with entry and exit
of ﬁrms, the procyclicality of the dispersion of ﬁrms’ investment rates is reinforced.
Based on their empirical results, Bachmann and Bayer (2011) turn to analyze if
a DSGE model with ﬁrms that face ﬁxed adjustment costs, like the model that I
present here, is able to account for the empirical evidence. Their model economy
is in the same vein of Khan and Thomas’ (2003) model; however, they introduce
additional features that make it much more complicated. In particular, additional to
the ﬁxed adjustment costs and the aggregate uncertainty, in their model ﬁrms face
idiosyncratic shocks and a second-moment shock that is modelled as a counter-
cyclical time-varying conditional standard deviation of aggregate shocks. Their
baseline results are presented in table 1. The ﬁrst and second columns show the
correlation coeﬃcient between the dispersion of the distribution of investment rates
across ﬁrms found by Bachmann and Bayer for US and German ﬁrms. The third
and fourth columns show the results of the model with and without second moment
shocks, respectively. The key result is that, although the dispersion of the distri-
bution of investment rates is procyclical, a model without second-moment shocks
overshoots the correlation considerably. Only with these countercyclical second-
moment shocks, the model estimates are closer to data evidence. Consequently, for
3Bachmann and Bayer indicate that ﬁrms present in Compustat are larger than the 5% of largest ﬁrms that are
present in the sample that they use to obtain their results for German economy.
6their results, the introduction of a countercyclical time-varying standard deviation
of aggregate productivity shocks is crucial.
The intuition of the dispersion of the investment rates procyclicality deserves
some explanation. In this class of models, where ﬁrms face ﬁxed adjustment costs,
aggregate investment combines an intensive margin (the diﬀerence between the cur-
rent capital stock of a particular ﬁrm and its desired optimal capital) with an ex-
tensive margin (the number of ﬁrms that undertake capital adjustment). This dis-
tinction cannot be made in a one-shock standard real business cycle model without
costs to adjustment because, in that case, all ﬁrms adjust their capital to the same
target and the distribution of ﬁrms over investment rates collapses: all ﬁrms invest
the same amount of resources each period. To ﬁx ideas, consider a case where the
intensive margin is irrelevant (for instance, assume that ﬁrms can only decide be-
tween adjusting a ﬁx amount of capital or letting their stock depreciate). In this
case, the distribution of ﬁrms over investment rates (and capital) is only determined
by the changes in the proportion of ﬁrms undertaking investment operations. In
this particular case, investment and its dispersion is increasing in the fraction of
ﬁrms adjusting. Therefore, if investment is procyclical, the dispersion across ﬁrms
of investment is also procyclical. Why do the results of Bachmann and Bayer (2011)
imply a higher response of the dispersion of ﬁrms over investment rate to aggregate
shocks than data evidence? Part of the explanation lies in the presence of aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Consider a case where ﬁrms face a high
realization of the aggregate productivity shock and only two ﬁrms decide to adjust.
If those ﬁrms have a diﬀerent capital stock but only face aggregate productivity
shocks, both ﬁrms adjust to the same level of capital stock. The other ﬁrms will not
adjust, and therefore, the dispersion of the distribution of ﬁrms’ investment rates
will increase. This eﬀect is reinforced in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity
shock because the same ﬁrms will not adjust their capital stock to the same level.
Therefore, in this case the dispersion of the distribution of investment rates across
ﬁrms will increase even more. Finally, the reason why second-moment shocks help
Bachmann and Bayer (2011) to match empirical evidence is simple. In their case,
second-moment shocks are modelled as a countercyclical process that reduces the
dispersion of aggregate shocks at higher realizations and this dampens the correla-
tion between the cyclical component of output and the dispersion of the distribution
of investment rates across ﬁrms.
7Table 1: Correlation of cyclical component of output and investment dispersion across ﬁrms
United Germany With 2d Order Without 2d Order
States Shocks Shocks
0.33 0.45 0.58 0.87
Source: Bachmann and Bayer (2011).
3 The Model
Here I describe the model that complements the work of Khan and Thomas (2003)
adding a government that collects a tax on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. For simplicity, I
assume that the government transfers to households all the resources that it collects
in a lump-sum manner. In this economy, there is a continuum of ﬁrms that face a
time-varying ﬁxed cost to undertake capital adjustments. In any period, if a ﬁrm
wants to change its capital level, it has to pay a ﬁxed cost that is independent of
the size of the adjustment. Because each ﬁrm faces idiosyncratic adjustment costs,
only those ﬁrms that anticipate that adjusting to the optimal capital stock will be
proﬁtable will do so, incurring in positive investment, while other ﬁrms will let their
capital depreciate, and will have an investment equal to zero. As a result, there are
distributions of ﬁrms over capital and over investment rates that characterize the
economy.
3.1 Firms
In this economy, ﬁrms compete in a perfect market and share the same diminishing
returns to scale production technology that uses capital and labor to produce a




where (θ + ν) < 1 and z is the total factor productivity shock. As usual, I assume
that z follows a Markov Chain with J states, where z ∈{ z1,z 2,...,zJ}, and
Pr(z
  = zj|z = zi) ≡ πij ≥ 0.
Here the   represents the value of a variable one period ahead. In any period
a ﬁrm is characterized by its level of capital, k, and the independent distributed
idiosyncratic adjustment cost, denoted by ξ ∈ [0,B], drawn from a distribution
function G(ξ) that does not change over time or across ﬁrms. Here B is the upper
bound of the distribution of adjustment costs, G(ξ). After production, the ﬁrm must
8decide whether to adjust its capital to a certain level, k , or let its capital depreciate
at a rate of δ.
The aggregate state of this economy is deﬁned as (z,μ) where μ is the distribution
of ﬁrms over capital, k, in the support K. This distribution evolves over time ac-
cording to the mapping Γ, which varies with the evolution of aggregate productivity,
μ  =Γ ( μ). In the following section I will explain how this distribution evolves over
time in the model. Following similar nomenclature as Khan and Thomas (2003), let
v1(k,ξ;z,μ) be the expected discounted value of a ﬁrm having the capital level of
k, facing a ﬁxed adjustment cost of ξ and an aggregate state of (z,μ). With this, I
can deﬁne the expected value of a ﬁrm prior the realization of the adjustment cost







In this economy, all ﬁrms pay a corporate tax for their proﬁts at rate τc that does
not change over time. Then, taken as given the evolution of the distribution of ﬁrms






















na(k,z,μ) are the value of the ﬁrm in the next period if it adjusts





























where Ez |z is the expected next period’s value of the productivity shock given the
information of the current period, dz (z,μ) is the stochastic discount factor applied
by a ﬁrm expecting a shock z  when the current productivity is z and γ is the
rate of exogenous technological progress.4 Just for notational convenience I have
4 Following King and Rebelo (1999) I assume that the eﬃciency units of labor grow at the exogenous rate of
γ1−θ − 1 where θ is capital’s share of aggregate output. This implies that growth trend of output is γ − 1. For this
9considered that each ﬁrm sells its capital at the end of the period and re purchases
it at the beginning of the next. Also, I have supposed that the adjustment cost, ξ,
is denominated in hours of labor. As in Gourio and Miao (2010a, 2010b), I have
assumed that ﬁrms do not pay corporate taxes for investment expenditure and there
are depreciation allowances represented by the term τδk in equation (3). The ﬁrm
chooses next period’s capital level and the amount of labor given the wage w(z,μ).
Note that in equation (5), the next period’s capital of a ﬁrm that does not adjust is
equal to k  = 1−δ
γ k. That happens because, when a ﬁrm lets its capital depreciate,
the capital in the next period is also less productive than the new capital of ﬁrms
that have adjusted because aggregate labor productivity grows at the rate of γ (see
King and Rebelo, 1999).
3.2 Households
In this economy there is a continuum of identical families that live inﬁnitely, that
are the owners of the ﬁrms and receive proﬁts for the shares that they hold. In
any period households have to choose their consumption level, how much labor to
supply and how many shares they want to hold for the next period. Following Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988), I assume that individuals have to choose employment
lotteries and have access to complete ﬁnancial markets that allow them to fully
diversify idiosyncratic risk. This implies that the economy behaves as if there were
a representative household with an instantaneous utility function given by,
u(c,N)=log(C)+A(1 − N). (6)
Here C is the consumption level and A is the value of the marginal disutility of





















reason, I require that next period’s units of capital be measured relative to the eﬃciency units of labor available at
that time. See King and Rebelo (1999) for more details.
10where λ is the number of shares that the household holds and ρ is their price, Tr
is the amount of transferences that households receive from the government and β
is a discount factor. Households receive earnings from their labor, the proﬁts of
the ﬁrms and government transferences, and spend those resources in consumption
and new shares represented by the second term in the left-hand side of the budget
constraint.
Let c(λ;z,μ) be the allocation of current consumption that maximizes households’
utility, n∗(λ;z,μ) their optimal labor supply and Λ(k,λ;z,μ) the number of shares
that the households purchase for the next period.
3.3 Recursive Equilibrium







1. v1 satisﬁes equation (3) to equation (5) and (l∗,k ∗) are the policy functions of
the ﬁrms;
2. W satisﬁes equation (7) and equation (8) and (c,n∗,Λ) are the associated policy
functions of the households;

























where Φ(x)=0i fx =0a n dΦ=1i fx  =0 ;
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∗(k,ξ;z,μ))G(dξ)μ(dk);










Here I explain how the model is solved. From the households’ utility maximization







Using these conditions one can compute a single Bellman equation for solving
the problem of households and ﬁrms at the same time. For simplicity I will assume,
like Khan and Thomas (2003), that the price that ﬁrms use to value their output
is equal to households’ marginal utility of consumption, p(z,μ)=1 /C. Therefore,























































Expressions (12) and (13) will be the base of the solution of the model.
Because the problem incorporates a discrete decision (each ﬁrm must choose
whether to adjust or not to adjust its capital) there is a non-linearity that impedes
to obtain a closed-form solution of the model. Therefore I proceed numerically to
obtain my results. As is usual in this literature, I will employ non-linear techniques
that build on Krusell and Smith (1997,1998). In order to solve its optimization
problem each ﬁrm has to know, ﬁrst, the price level of the economy and, second, the
12distribution of ﬁrms over capital. But, since the distribution of ﬁrms over capital is
continuous, it cannot be used as a state variable in the ﬁrms’ optimization problem.
Therefore, I will assume that, when a ﬁrm makes its decision it does not observe the
complete distribution of ﬁrms over capital, but only the aggregate capital stock of the
economy. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm only knows the aggregate capital level, denominated
by K, and infers both next period’s aggregate capital level, K , and the current
price level, P, using the following simple OLS rules for each aggregate productivity
state j ∈ J:
log(K
 )=β0K,j + β1K,jlog(K), (14)
log(P)=β0P,j + β1P,jlog(K). (15)
Therefore, after a ﬁrm has observed the productivity shock and current aggregate
capital level, it can infer both the current aggregate price and the next period’s
aggregate capital. With these variables, the ﬁrm can make its decision regarding
labor and next period’s capital. The optimal labor decision, l∗(k;z,μ), comes from






The optimal decision for next period’s capital level comes from solving equation
(12). Suppose that k∗ is the capital level that maximizes equation (12) given current
aggregate capital and productivity shock. Then, a ﬁrm will adjust its capital level
to k∗ only if the expected value of the ﬁrm minus the ﬁxed adjustment cost is higher
than the value of the ﬁrm if it allows its capital depreciate. Let  ξ(z,μ) be the value
of the adjustment cost that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between adjusting and not
adjusting its capital level. Then, making equal (12) to (13) one gets,

























Note that I have replace μ, for the aggregate capital K. Next, I deﬁne
ξ(z,K) = min{B,max{ ξ(z,K),0}}, (18)
so that 0 ≤ ξ(z,K) ≤ B. Consequently, only those ﬁrms with idiosyncratic adjust-
13ment cost below ξ(z,K) will adjust their capital level to k∗.
Given the ﬁrms’ next period capital level decision, I can deﬁne the evolution of






























The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (19) corresponds to those ﬁrms
that have drawn an idiosyncratic adjustment cost below ξ(z,K) and adjust to k  =
k∗, while the second term corresponds to those ﬁrms that have drawn a higher
adjustment cost, have let their capital depreciate and, as a consequence, have reached
a level of k  = k∗ that is just equal to the optimal level. The term in the right-
hand side of equation (20) corresponds to non-adjusters that have a k  equal to
((1 − δ)/γ)k.







ν − w(z,K)l)μ(dk). (21)
Then I can obtain the levels of output, consumption, investment and total labor











∗(z,K) − (1 − δ)k]G(ξ(k;z,K))μ(dk), (23)













14where the second term comes from the fact that in this model, adjustment costs are
denominated in units of labor and only those ﬁrms that obtain an adjustment cost
below ξ(z,K) change their capital stock.
5 Numerical Method
In this section I explain in detail the numerical procedure used to solve the model.
Since the ﬁrm’s problem does not have an analytical solution I have to ﬁnd it
using an optimization algorithm and make a discretization over certain variables.
In particular, I use value function iteration to solve the problem of equation (11)
over a multidimensional grid of points where the state variables are the idiosyncratic
capital level, the aggregate level of capital and the productivity shock. The speciﬁc
steps are the following:
1. First, guess a set of parameters for βP and βK, deﬁne a grid of points for z, k
and K and use equations (14) and (15) to solve equation (11) for each point
on the grid.
2. Second, simulate the economy for T periods saving the distribution of ﬁrms
over capital in each of them. In order to solve the model in each period, ﬁrst
I generate an initial distribution of ﬁrms and calculate the aggregate capital,
which in turn is used for calculating next period’s aggregate capital level using
equation (14). That deﬁnes both the value of the ﬁrm if it adjusts its capital
as well as the value of the ﬁrm if it does not adjust, for any current aggregate
price level. Nevertheless, equation (15) is never used for solving the price level
of the economy, instead the equilibrium price will be calculated iteratively. For
doing this, ﬁrst I guess a price and then verify if that price is equal to the price
implied by the optimality conditions of the household’s maximization problem,
such that the guess is equal to the marginal utility of consumption. Let pe be
the guess of the price level of the economy. With that price one can solve for
the labor demand of each ﬁrm, l∗, next period’s optimal capital level, k∗, and
the decision rule, ξ(z,K), given the aggregate productivity shock z. Then, use
equations (22), (23) and (24) to obtain a new price level, pv =1 /C.I f pv is
near pe, save that price level and continue with the simulation, but, if they are
suﬃciently diﬀerent, given some convergence criteria, update pe using
p
e = χp
e +( 1− χ)p
v,
15where 0 <χ<1.
3. Third, use equations (19) and (20) to update the distribution of ﬁrms over cap-
ital. Following these steps one can obtain an endogenous path for the aggregate
capital and aggregate price level that can be used in the next step.
4. Finally, update ﬁrms’ forecasting rules using the path of the aggregate variables.
In particular, recalculate the values of βP, βK using OLS and evaluate if the new
parameters are equal to the initial guess. If that is the case, the convergence
is complete, so use the simulated aggregate variables to calculate the results.
If it is not, update the values of the parameters and return to step 1. In
order to ensure that the distribution of ﬁrms comes from the ergodic set, in
each iteration update the initial distribution of ﬁrms over capital using the last
distribution of ﬁrms from the previous iteration.
This procedure, although imposing a high computational burden, generates ac-
curate predictions for the aggregate variables. Indeed, the R2 of the OLS regressions
are very high (up to 99%) when convergence has been reached (see the numerical
appendix for details).
6 Parametrization
The model solution requires the selection of several parameters. Here I use similar
values to Khan and Thomas (2003) and take the corporate tax rate from Djankov et
al. (2010). The authors report a corporate tax rate for the United States economy’s,
τc, of 18.19%, the value that I use in my simulation. I ﬁx the length of the period to
one year, which allows me to use establishment-level investment data provided by
Doms and Dunne (1998) in the parametrization of the adjustment cost distribution.
The value of A, the marginal disutility of labor in the utility function, is chosen to
match a 20% of time dedicated to labor each year. I ﬁx the mean growth rate of
technological progress, γ, at 1.6%, pick a value of β to imply an average interest
rate of 6.5% (King and Rebelo, 1999) and a rate of capital depreciation that implies
an average investment-to-capital ratio of 7.6%. For θ and ν I use values of 0.325
and 0.58, respectively. I set the parameters for the shock process according to
Khan and Thomas (2003). In particular, I assume that the shock is a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process with a persistence parameter of 0.9225 and a variance of
innovations of 0.0134.5 Finally, I have to choose parameters for the adjustment
5See the Numerical Appendix for details.
16cost distribution. I assume that the adjustment costs are uniform with cumulative
distribution G(ξ)=ξ/B, where B is the upper bound of the distribution. That
bound is selected to match three results of Doms and Dunne’s (1998) research: 1)
in one year, lumpy investors (those that increase their capital stock by more than
30% of their previous capital level) account for 25% percent of total investment in
the economy, 2) these lumpy investors are a very small proportion of total ﬁrms,
roughly 8%, and 3) the other 75% of the investment is carried out by ﬁrms with an
investment level below 10% of their previous capital level. A value of B =0 .002
almost matches these observations. Table 2 shows the parameters used to simulate
the model.
Table 2: Parameters
γβ δθ ν Aρ σ ε Bτ c
1.016 0.954 0.06 0.325 0.58 3.614 0.9225 0.0134 0.002 18.19%
7 Results
7.1 Cyclical Properties of the Model Economy
In this section I begin the exposition of the results of the model. Table 3 shows the
volatility, the contemporaneous correlations with output and the ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation of the key aggregate variables of my model economy. These results are
obtained using the algorithm of the previous section and the parameters of table
2. All aggregate series are in logs and have been HP-ﬁltered using a smoothing
parameter of 100. In table 3, columns labelled Data correspond to empirical ev-
idence of the cyclical component of the United States macroeconomic aggregates
calculated by King and Rebelo (1999), while those labelled Model show my model’s
results. In the face of aggregate productivity shocks, my model economy exhibits
an output volatility of 1.84, which is almost equal to data evidence. The others
main macroeconomic aggregates show similar business cycle dispersion to standard
representative agents models (see Khan and Thomas (2003) for a discussion).
In the light of this evidence, one can ask what is the contribution of corporate
tax and the ﬁrms’ heterogeneity generated by ﬁxed adjustment costs. To gauge
that contribution I compare the results of three additional exercises. In the ﬁrst
case I set the value of τc = 0 and eliminate the heterogeneity setting the value
of B, the upper bound of the distribution of idiosyncratic adjustment costs, near
17Table 3: Business cycle estimates of the model with τc =0
Standard Stand. Deviation Contemporaneous First Order
Deviation Rel. to Output Correlation AutoCorrelations
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Y 1.81 1.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.94
C 1.35 0.92 0.75 0.50 0.88 0.94 0.80 0.98
I 5.30 6.07 2.93 3.30 0.80 0.97 0.87 0.82
N 1.79 1.03 0.99 0.56 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.76
w 1.68 0.92 0.93 0.50 0.12 0.94 0.66 0.98
r 0.30 0.89 0.17 0.48 - 0.35 0.66 0.60 0.20
zero.6 In that case, ﬁrms adjust their capital each period and the distribution of
ﬁrms over capital collapses to a unique level given the state of the productivity
shock. This happens because ﬁrms’ investment decisions are based on the value
of ξ(z,μ), the adjustment cost level that makes ﬁrms indiﬀerent between adjusting
their capital stock or letting it depreciate. Since ξ(z,μ) is always between 0 and B
(see equation (18)), the probability of an adjustment cost being higher than ξ(z,μ)
i s0i fB is near 0 and, therefore, all ﬁrms will ﬁnd that it is proﬁtable to adjust each
period. Additionally, since the only source of heterogeneity between ﬁrms are the
idiosyncratic adjustment costs, all ﬁrms adjust to the same level of capital and the
distribution collapses. The second and third exercises considers two cases; ﬁrst, I
keep B near 0 and set the value of τc =1 8 .79% and, second, I set the corporate tax
rate equal to 0 again and ﬁx the value of B as in table 2. The comparison between
all these numerical exercises will give a measure of the marginal contribution of each
element to my business cycle estimates. The results are shown in table 4.7
Table 4: Business cycle estimates of the model with diﬀerent levels τc y B
τc =0B=0 τc = 0 B = 0.002 τc = 18.79 B = 0
Std Rel Contem 1st Std Rel Contem 1st Std Rel Contem 1st
Y 1.88 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.89 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.84 1.00 1.00 0.94
C 1.18 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.89 0.47 0.91 0.98 1.08 0.59 0.72 0.96
I 6.79 3.61 0.87 0.96 6.42 3.40 0.97 0.81 6.95 3.78 0.89 0.77
N 1.09 0.58 0.95 0.75 1.13 0.60 0.95 0.76 1.03 0.56 0.94 0.77
w 1.18 0.63 0.73 0.96 0.89 0.47 0.91 0.98 1.08 0.59 0.72 0.96
r 1.31 0.70 0.49 0.07 0.83 0.44 0.68 0.25 1.28 0.70 0.47 - 0.12
Note that in all cases presented in table 4, the standard deviation of output and
investment are higher than my baseline estimates. When the model does not con-
sider any friction (as in the case where τc and B are equal to zero), the volatility
of output is 1.88 while the volatility of investment is 6.79. That happens because
6Note that B cannot be 0 because I have supposed that the distribution function of idiosyncratic adjustment
costs is uniform.
7In table 4 column Std corresponds to the standard deviation of each variable, Rel is the standard deviation of
each variable relative to output standard deviation, Contem is the contemporaneous correlation with output and
1st is the ﬁrst output autocorrelation of each variable.
18without the friction generated by the adjustment costs, ﬁrms change their capital
stock each period and, therefore, the volatility of aggregate investment increases.
Consequently, output volatility and consumption volatility also increase. The in-
troduction of adjustment costs has the predicted eﬀect: since ﬁrms are less willing
to adjust as a response to a shock due to the ﬁxed cost that they have to pay, the
volatility of investment declines. Besides, output and consumption volatility also
have to decline because the aggregate capital is less volatile. In the case where only
the corporate tax rate is considered (last section of table 4), the model estimates
are quite in line with empirical evidence.
However, because the focus of this work is to analyze the role of adjustment costs
and heterogeneity, I consider the case with adjustment costs and a positive corporate
tax rate as my basic benchmark. Consequently, in the following sections I will take
the results presented in table 3 as my baseline estimation. Although the consumption
volatility is lower compared with the other estimates of my model under diﬀerent
parametrizations, it represents fairly well the cyclical behavior of investment and
output, which is the main focus of this paper. Moreover, as I will explain in the
following section in more detail, if there are no idiosyncratic adjustment costs, ﬁrms
will concentrate in the same capital stock and will adjust their capital each period to
the same optimal level. As a consequence, the distribution of ﬁrms over capital will
collapse to that optimal capital level and the statistics related with the dispersion
of the distribution of ﬁrms over investment rates cannot be calculated.
7.2 Investment Dispersion Across the Cycle
7.2.1 Simple Stylized Example
Now I evaluate the correlation of investment dispersion across ﬁrms and output
cyclicality using the model of section 2. First, note that, compared with the model
of Bachmann and Bayer (2011), the model presented here lacks idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty and second-moment shocks. Second, the intuition explained in the previous
section applies also to the simpler model like the one that I have presented in this
paper. In order to make this idea more clear, consider a very stylized case where
ﬁrms are distributed only over two diﬀerent capital levels, k0 and k1, like the distri-
bution depicted in ﬁgure 1. In this example I use a depreciation rate equal to zero.
Now, consider that a shock hits the economy and the optimal capital is given by
k2. Finally, consider that 50% of the ﬁrms draw an idiosyncratic adjustment cost,
19ξ, below ξ(k,μ), so that, 50% of ﬁrms adjust their capital. The next period’s distri-
bution of ﬁrms over capital will look like the one depicted in ﬁgure 2. Clearly, the
dispersion of ﬁrms over capital increases and the same happens with the distribution
of ﬁrms over investment. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of investment after the
shock in this simpliﬁed example. The cross sectional dispersion of the investment
has increased after the shock. Note also that this result holds only if there are cap-
ital adjustment costs. Without them, all ﬁrms would adjust to the optimal capital
k2 instantly and the capital dispersion across ﬁrms would be equal to zero after the
initial shock. The dispersion increases only for one period and then it is zero inde-
pendent of the new shocks that may hit the economy. Something similar happens
with the distribution of investment rates. Its dispersion increases only in the period
when the ﬁrst shock hits the economy. After that, because all the ﬁrms have the
same capital stock, all invest the same amount of resources that only depends on
the magnitude of the new shocks that impact the economy. In that case, all ﬁrms
move together and the dispersion is 0. Moreover, if the capital adjustment cost is
the same for all ﬁrms, the dispersion of investment across ﬁrms is again equal to 0.
In that case, after the initial shock, all ﬁrms would be in one of two states: either
all ﬁrms adjust their capital to the optimal because the proﬁts obtained using the
optimal capital level oﬀset the losses incurred in the adjustment process, or non ﬁrm
adjusts its capital stock. In both states the dispersion of investment across ﬁrms is
0 after the initial shock because all ﬁrms invest the same positive amount in the ﬁrst
case, or 0 in the second case. Note that in a model with convex adjustment costs one
can obtain similar results to those of a non-convex adjustment costs. In this paper
I am not considering such kind of adjustment costs for the following reasons. First,
the distributional eﬀects would be weaker. In these models, ﬁrms are unwilling to
incur in large adjustments because that implies large adjustment costs. Therefore,
after a shock ﬁrms only adjust partially to the new target. After the shock, all
ﬁrms would change their capital stock to a new level that is between their initial
level and their target and, the distribution of ﬁrms over capital level would have
the same dispersion of the initial capital distribution. In terms of the distribution
of ﬁrms over investment rates, since all ﬁrms adjust their capital, it is clear that
the distribution would look less disperse than the one presented in ﬁgure 3. Sec-
ond, convex adjustment costs are not consistent with the microeconomic evidence
of lumpy investment discussed before, which is the main focus of this paper.
207.2.2 Steady-State Results
One can use the model of the previous section for studying the last intuition more
formally. Consider as an example a economy that has faced an average aggregate
productivity shock for several periods, so that the economy has converged to a steady
state. Here I have ﬁxed the value of τc equal to 0. In this economy, a steady state
implies that the aggregate variables are constant over time although at ﬁrm level
there are still capital adjustments. In other words, the aggregate levels of capital,
labor and output are constant, but, because the capital depreciates and average
productivity increases, ﬁrms observe that their capital is farther from the optimal
capital the longer the time that has passed from the last adjustment. The economy
does not collapse to a distribution of ﬁrms of the same size because adjustment costs
prevent that. Therefore, in a steady state, aggregate capital is constant, but at the
ﬁrm level there are still capital changes. That can be appreciated in ﬁgure 5. The
horizontal axis represents diﬀerent capital levels. The green line is the adjustment
hazard rate that shows, in the right-hand vertical axis, the probability that a ﬁrm
has to adjust its capital level to the optimal, while the blue line shows in the left-
hand axis the distribution of ﬁrms over capital (the proportion of total mass of
ﬁrms that have a particular capital level). The part of the distribution of ﬁrms over
capital that is under the green line is the proportion of ﬁrms that adjust their capital
level each period. Note that the adjustment hazard rate is centered on the optimal
capital level given the aggregate productivity. That happens because those ﬁrms
that have a capital level that is equal to the optimal capital given the aggregate
productivity shock, have an adjustment probability equal to zero. In this example,
the optimal capital level and the proportion of ﬁrms that undertake investment each
period are shown in the ﬁrst row of fourth and ﬁfth columns of table 5.
Now, consider that a positive shock of productivity hits the economy. The second
panel of ﬁgure 5 shows the distribution of ﬁrms over capital in the same period that
the shocks arrives. First note that the target capital increases from 1.12 to 1.18.
That represents an increase of 6% as the last row of table 5 shows. Now, note
from the second panel of ﬁgure 5 that after the shock, a higher proportion of ﬁrms
are under the adjustment hazard rate line and more ﬁrms are willing to adjust. In
particular, the proportion of adjusters increases 9%. More relevant, the proportion
of lumpy adjusters increases dramatically by almost 180% (last column of table
5). Those ﬁrms change their capital for the next period after the shock, when
21aggregate productivity is on its average again and the target capital has returned to
its original value of 1.12. That is shown in the last panel of ﬁgure 5, which depicts a
more disperse distribution of ﬁrms over capital due to the increase in the extensive
margin (the proportion of ﬁrms adjusting their capital) and the intensive margin
(the temporal increase in the target capital). The same can be appreciated in ﬁgure
6 that shows the distribution of ﬁrms over investment before and after the shock.
Clearly, the distribution is more disperse after the shock, as shown in the second
panel.
Table 5: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock
Time Standard Deviation Standard Deviation Target % % Lumpy
Capital Distribution Investment Distribution Capital Adjusters Adjusters
t 0.1736 0.0097 1.1209 0.3807 0.1098
t+1 0.1872 0.0119 1.1835 0.4135 0.3065
% change 8% 23% 6% 9% 179%
Now consider that this economy is in steady state again and receives a negative
shock of similar magnitude to the positive shock discussed before. The results are
shown in table 6 and in ﬁgures 7 and 8. Note that in this case there are still some
ﬁrms that are willing to adjust (there is a proportion of ﬁrms that are under the
adjustment hazard rate after the negative shock) but both the optimal capital and
the proportion of adjusting ﬁrms decrease in comparison with the situation prior to
the shock. Note also that the proportion of lumpy adjusters is almost 0 in this case.
Moreover, the reduction is, in absolute terms, stronger than the increase generated
by the positive shock. The consequence is that the distribution of ﬁrms over capital
now is thicker and the dispersion decreases, as shown in the ﬁrst column of table 6
in the second panel of ﬁgure 8.
Table 6: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock
Time Standard Deviation Standard Deviation Target % % Lumpy
Capital Distribution Investment Distribution Capital Adjusters Adjusters
t 0.1736 0.0097 1.1209 0.3807 0.1098
t+1 0.1540 0.0078 1.0646 0.2991 0.0225
% change -11% -20% -5% -21% -80%
7.2.3 Dynamic Results
Keeping the last idea in mind, now I turn to the quantitative evaluation of the
correlation between investment dispersion and the cyclical component of output.
In order to make my results directly comparable to those of Bachmann and Bayer
(2011), I set the corporate tax rate equal to zero. The central section of table
224 shows the volatility, correlation with output and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of
the key aggregate variables. First note that, compared with the model with a
positive corporate tax rate, the economy is more volatile in terms of the cyclical
component standard deviation of output and investment. However, my model yields
similar results to other models in the literature (see Khan and Thomas, 2003).
Table 7 shows the correlation between the dispersion of investment distribution
and the cyclical component of output for US and Germany. I also show three
additional statistics that are relevant for Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011) results. In
the table, ρσ,y is the correlation coeﬃcient between the investment dispersion and
the cyclical component of aggregate output for US and German economies, and ρg,y
is the correlation of value added growth dispersion across ﬁrms and the cyclical
component of output for the German economy. 8 Comparing the second column
with the third one gets the main point of this section: in order to obtain a positive
correlation between investment distribution dispersion and the cyclical component of
output, the key element is the presence idiosyncratic ﬁxed adjustment costs. Using
a standard ﬁxed adjustment cost model, I can obtain the same results of a richer
model like the one of Bachmann and Bayer (2011): my model implies a higher
correlation coeﬃcient than the results obtained for US and Germany economies.
Note that, in terms of the correlation between the proportion of adjusters and the
cyclical component of output (the second row in table 7), I obtain similar correlations
as Bachmann and Bayer (2011); however, my estimate related with the proportion
of lumpy adjusters is smaller. As I will show in the following section, this result
changes if I consider a positive corporate tax rate. An additional divergence between
my results and Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011) estimates is related with value added
growth dispersion of ﬁrms. In their results as well in the data, the correlation
coeﬃcient between this variable and the cyclical component of output is negative.
However, my estimate is near 0.9
Table 7: Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011)and model’s results with τc =0
United Germany Bachmann and This paper
States Bayer (2011) with τc =0
ρy,σ 0.33 0.45 0.58 0.57
ρy,g - -0.45 -0.42 -0.06
% Adjusters - 0.73 0.42 0.46
% Lumpy Adjusters - 0.61 0.38 0.02
Source: Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and author’s estimates.
8I do not have statistics of this correlation or the other estimates for US economy.
9Here I have used the same deﬁnition of adjusters and lumpy adjusters as Bachmann and Bayer (2011). A lumpy
investor is such ﬁrm with an investment rate of |
ii,y
0.5(ki,t+ki,t+1)| > 0.2. This convention was ﬁrst used by Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006).
237.3 Corporate Tax Rate and Investment Dispersion
Can a model that considers a government that collects taxes on corporate proﬁts
make better predictions about the procyclicality of the standard deviation of the
distribution of investment? My results suggest that it really can. In order to gain
some intuition, ﬁrst, consider the eﬀect that an increase in the corporate tax rate has
on the ﬁrms’ investment decisions. On one hand, there are eﬀects on the intensive
margin of capital adjustment. A higher corporate tax rate decreases the optimal level
of capital that maximizes equation (12). This happens because a higher corporate
tax rate reduces the value of the ﬁrm in all periods and, as a consequence, there is a
reduction of the earnings that a ﬁrm obtains per unit of investment. To clarify this,




∂k  = −γp(z,μ)+
∂Ez |zβV 0(k ;z ,μ  )
∂k  =0 . (26)
Abstracting from general equilibrium eﬀects in marginal changes of the capital stock
of a particular ﬁrm, clearly if V 0(k ;z ,μ  ) decreases, k  has to decrease also in order
to keep the ﬁrst-order condition, since V 0(k ;z ,μ  ) is increasing in k.
On the other hand, a higher corporate tax rate makes ﬁrms less willing to adjust
in the presence of a shock, positive or negative. This is the extensive margin. This
happens because the reduction in the value of the ﬁrm implies that the proﬁts are
lower compared with the adjustment cost, and consequently, the adjustment cost
that makes ﬁrms indiﬀerent between adjusting or not adjusting decreases. That can
be appreciated in equation (17). There, the value of V 0 decreases independently
of the adjustment decision of the ﬁrms in a proportion that should be near to τk.
Therefore, the proportion of ﬁrms that draw an adjustment cost higher than ξ(z,μ)
increases and with this, the fraction of adjusters decreases. Now, the joint eﬀect
of the intensive and the extensive margins over the procyclicality of the dispersion
of investment distribution across ﬁrms comes from the following. Consider that,
after a positive shock, ﬁrms adjust to an optimal capital that is lower than the
optimal capital to which ﬁrms would adjust in the case of a corporate tax rate
equal to zero, simply because the next period’s value of the ﬁrms has decreased.
Therefore, ﬁrms do not adjust to k2 in ﬁgure 2 but to k3 in ﬁgure 4. Moreover,
for the reasons explained above, the fraction of ﬁrms that adjust decreases. Both
24eﬀects are depicted in ﬁgure 4 where I have considered that only 40% of ﬁrms have
adjusted their capital stock. Clearly, compared with ﬁgure 2, the distribution of
ﬁrms over capital depicted in ﬁgure 4 shows lower dispersion and the same happens
with the distribution of investment across ﬁrms. Consequently, the procyclicality of
investment dispersion is lower the higher is the corporate tax rate.
7.3.1 Steady-State Results
I can perform a similar analysis to the one presented in previous section. Beginning
from a steady-state situation, but now assuming a positive corporate tax rate equal
to 18.79%, I can evaluate the distributional eﬀects of a positive and a negative
productivity shock. The results are shown in tables 8 and 9 and ﬁgures 9 to 12.
As expected, the distributional eﬀects of a positive or negative shock are weaker
than the case with a corporate tax rate equal to 0 (see table 5 and 6). Note that in
this case, the dispersion of the distribution of ﬁrms over investment rates respond
less to the positive shock. This happens even if the percentage change in the target
capital and the proportion of investors is equal in both cases (compare the third
and fourth columns of tables 5 and 8). The main diﬀerence is in the proportion
of lumpy adjusters: while, with a corporate tax rate of zero, the number of ﬁrms
that invest a huge amount of resources grows dramatically (179%), in this case,
with a corporate tax rate of 18.79%, the increase, though large, is smaller (112%).
Consequently, all the reduction in the response of investment dispersion across ﬁrms
to a positive productivity shock can be associated with the smaller proportion of
ﬁrms that undertake large adjustments after the shock. Something similar happens
when the economy faces a negative productivity shock: the proportion of lumpy
adjusters decreases less in this case than in the case with a corporate tax rate equal
to 0.
Table 8: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock and τc =1 8 .79%
Time Standard Deviation Standard Deviation Target % % Lumpy
Capital Distribution Investment Distribution Capital Adjusters Adjusters
t 0.1411 0.0074 1.0771 0.3343 0.1792
t+1 0.1523 0.0080 1.1397 0.3660 0.3798
% change 8% 8% 6% 9% 112%
7.3.2 Dynamic Results in the Presence of Corporate Taxes
Now I turn to the eﬀects that the presence of corporate taxation has on business
cycle proprieties of the model. The results are shown in table 10. The ﬁrst three
25Table 9: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock and τc =1 8 .79%
Time Standard Deviation Standard Deviation Target % % Lumpy
Capital Distribution Investment Distribution Capital Adjusters Adjusters
t 0.1411 0.0074 1.0771 0.3343 0.1792
t+1 0.1321 0.0061 1.0208 0.2628 0.0663
% change -6% -18% -5% -21% -63%
columns show the results of Bachmann and Bayer (2011) already presented, and
the last four show the results for diﬀerent values of τc. Note how the correlation
coeﬃcient between the dispersion of the distribution of investment rates across ﬁrms
and the cyclical component of output declines the higher is the corporate tax rate,
in line with the intuition presented before (ﬁrst row of table 10). When τc is equal
to 18.79%, which is the eﬀective corporate tax rate calculated by Djankov et al.
(2008) for the United States’ economy, the correlation is 0.51, which is 12% lower
than the original estimates with a corporate tax equal to 0. Now, when I consider a
corporate tax of 23.5%, which corresponds to the eﬀective corporate tax rate of the
German economy, the gap between model’s estimates and data evidence is almost
zero. Note also that, in terms of the correlation between the fraction of adjusters
and lumpy adjusters, my estimates are very close to Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011)
results. This can also be appreciated in the table 11 where I show the correlation
implied by the model relative to the data. Note that, for the correlation coeﬃcient,
the diﬀerence of Bachmann and Bayer’s (2011) results with data is 30% but is less
than 2% in the last column.
Table 10: Correlation of dispersion of investment and the cyclical component of output
Bachmann and Bayer (2011) This Paper
United Germany Model τc =0 1 8 .79% 23.5%
States
ρy,σ 0.33 0.45 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.46
% Adjusters - 0.73 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.42
% Lumpy Adjusters - 0.61 0.38 0.02 0.34 0.43
Source: Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and author’s estimates
Table 11: Model correlations relative to data evidence for Germany
Bachmann and Bayer (2011) This Paper
Model τc =0 1 8 .79% 23.5%
ρy,σ 1.29 1.28 1.13 1.02
% Adjusters 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.58
% Lumpy Adjusters 0.62 0.03 0.55 0.69
Source: Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and author’s estimates
My results suggest that a model that considers corporate taxation is able to
close the gap considerably. The discrepancies between model results and empirical
26evidence are reduces especially when I consider the evidence for Germany. However,
there is an important caveat: the calibration that I have used refers to US economy
and not for Germany economy like Bachmann and Bayer’s model. Though some
parameters are very similar, the main diﬀerences lies in the calibration of the upper
bound of the distribution of adjustment costs. Table 10 shows the correlation for
United States’ ﬁrms which is quite lower than the model’s results. However, as I
said, the results have to be considered as a lower bound. Additional research has to
be made in order to obtain a better estimation of the correlation between investment
dispersion across ﬁrms and the business cycle for the United States’ economy.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I have studied a new business cycle fact documented by Bachmann
and Bayer (2011): the dispersion of the distribution of the investment rate across
ﬁrms is procyclical. Using a wide sample of German ﬁrms they ﬁnd a correlation
coeﬃcient between the cyclical component of output and the standard deviation of
the distribution of investment rates across ﬁrms of 0.45. The correlation coeﬃcient
for US economy is equal to 0.33. Here I have shown that a model similar to Kahn and
Thomas (2003), which is standard to heterogeneous ﬁrms literature, can account well
for that correlation. The model predicts a correlation coeﬃcient between investment
distribution dispersion and the cyclical component of output of 0.57. Moreover, I
ﬁnd that adding a government sector that levies taxes on corporate proﬁts, the
model can account for the correlation found by Bachmann and Bayer (2011) much
better. In particular, I ﬁnd that considering a corporate tax rate of 18.79%, that is
the eﬀective corporate tax rate of the United States, the correlation is reduced to
0.51, and when I consider a corporate tax rate of 23.5%, which corresponds to the
German economy, the correlation coeﬃcient predicted by my model is 0.46, which is
almost equal to empirical evidence. The key element to obtain a positive correlation
between ﬁrms’ investment rate dispersion and the business cycle is the presence of




Here I show the optimality conditions of households’ optimization problem. These
optimality conditions are used to obtain equations (9) y (10) in the text. The
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= −A +Ω w =0 , (31)
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which is equation (9) in the text. Now, to obtain equation (10) in the text, ﬁrst





Using the Envelope Theorem one gets that the partial derivative respect with λ in














 )) − Ωρ(k;z,μ)=0 , (36)
Then, note that dz (z,μ) is the discount factor of the ﬁrms, that is equal to
ρ(k;z,μ)
(v0(k ;z ,μ ))
and in steady-state Ω  = Ω. Using this in equation (36) one gets
dz (z,μ)=β, (37)
which is equation (10) in the text.
Numerical Appendix
In this section I describe in more detail the numerical procedure used to solve the
model. The model solution relies on two key assumptions: 1) each ﬁrm does not
observe the entire distribution of ﬁrms over capital but only the aggregate level,
and 2) ﬁrms forecast the aggregate price and next period’s aggregate capital using
the simple rules deﬁned by equations (14) and (15). The ﬁrst assumption allows
me to replace μ by K in the ﬁrm’s problem and reduces the dynamic programming
problem to a three-dimensional state space (k;z,K). Since the employment problem
has an analytical solution, there is essentially just one continuous control variable,
k . I have discretized the state space as follows:
1. For k, the individual capital level, I use 400 equi-spaced points on the interval
[0.1,5]. I tried with a grid in logs and using a grid with more points at lower
levels of capital, where the curvature of the value function is higher, but the
results did not change.
292. For K, the aggregate capital level, I used 50 equi-spaced points on the interval
[0.7,1.4].
3. For z, the aggregate productivity shock, I used the same grid as Khan and
Thomas (2003). I assume an exogenous logarithmic autoregressive process of
the form,
log(z
 )=ρlog(z)+ε, ε ∼ n(0,σ ε). (38)
In Khan and Thomas (2003), the parameter of persistence, ρ and the log-normal
innovations, σε are chosen to be consistent with measured Solow residuals from
the US economy between the years 1953 and 1997. Then, this process is dis-
cretized using a grid of 5 points which are:
z =[ 0 .9328;0.9658;1.00;1.0354;1.0720].
These parameters are similar to those chosen by Bachmann and Bayer (2011)
to simulate their model.
Since I allow for continuous control, k and K can take any value. However,
I can only compute the value function for each combination of points of the grids
described above. That arises two problems: 1) the aggregate capital calculated from
the simulated distribution of ﬁrms may not be included in the grid, and 2) the value
of k  that maximizes (12) may not be on the grid either. In order to solve these
problems I use two additional procedures. I solve the ﬁrst by interpolating the value
function for in-between points. This is done using a multidimensional cubic splines
based on the spapi Matlab function with four knots for each dimension (see Judd,
1998). I solve the second problem using Golden Section Search (see Miranda and
Fackler (2002) for details).
For the simulation, I draw one random series for the aggregate productivity level
and ﬁx it across models. I simulate the economy for T = 1500 periods and discard
the ﬁrst 500 periods for calculating the main statistics. I do so in order to ensure
that results are not driven by the initial conditions of the economy, especially by
the initial distribution of ﬁrms over capital.
For solving the equilibrium price level I used guess-and-verify with a convergence
criteria of 10−5. In some cases, especially when the forecasting rules are far from
30their convergence level, the optimal price level cannot be found. In those cases,
I broke the iteration procedure after 2000 iterations and used the last price level
to continue the simulation. However, the diﬀerences in absolute value between the
guess and the price level implied by the model were never higher than 10−3.
Finally, the convergence criteria for the forecasting rules parameters was 10−5.
When the convergence was reached, the forecasting rules were very accurate in
predicting the aggregate price level and next period’s capital level: the R2 of the
OLS estimation is higher that 99%. In table 12, I show the R2 of forecasting rules
in the baseline case.
Table 12: Forecasting rules
R2
P R2
K β0P β1P β0K β1K
0.9972 0.9993 1.2034 -0.4848 -0.0195 0.8261
0.9986 0.9942 1.1810 -0.4810 -0.0071 0.8251
0.9993 0.9953 1.1584 -0.4789 0.0054 0.8226
0.9991 0.9953 1.1355 -0.4767 0.0181 0.8207
0.9994 0.9945 1.1123 -0.4738 0.0308 0.8204
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33Figure 1: Initial distribution
Figure 2: Distribution after a shock
Figure 3: Investment distribution after a shock
34Figure 4: Distribution after the shock with τc > 0
Figure 5: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock - capital distribution
Figure 6: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock - investment distribution
35Figure 7: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock - capital distribution
Figure 8: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock - investment distribution
Figure 9: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock - capital distribution - τc =1 8 .79%
36Figure 10: Distributional eﬀects of a positive shock - investment distribution - τc =1 8 .79%
Figure 11: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock - capital distribution - τc =1 8 .79%
Figure 12: Distributional eﬀects of a negative shock - investment distribution - τc =1 8 .79%
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